CIA brief flagged bin Laden threat to India
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Washington, Sep 12 : A CIA intelligence brief listed India among countries where Osama bin Laden intended to carry out attacks in 1998, according to documents released that also detail his network’s Pakistani connections and the Taliban’s refusal to expel him.
The August 28, 1998, assessment named India and Pakistan alongside Egypt, countries in the Arabian Peninsula, Uganda and possibly Nigeria as potential locations for attacks.
The source behind that information is redacted. The visible passage does not identify an Indian target, an attack date or a specific operational plan.
Titled Bin Ladin Terrorist Network Still a Threat, the brief said bin Laden and other terrorist leaders based in Afghanistan had survived US strikes. Their communications network remained intact, training had resumed at some camps and other camps were being moved.
It assessed that bin Laden could draw on individuals and allied groups in at least 60 countries to conduct attacks.
The document is among 71 President’s Daily Brief products declassified by CIA Director John Ratcliffe to mark the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. The agency described the collection as its largest release of declassified CIA presidential briefing products related to 9/11.
The documents also address the Kandahar hostage crisis and Pakistan’s dealings with militants associated with bin Laden.
A January 3, 2000, assessment said the Taliban’s Council of Ministers had unanimously decided the previous month against expelling bin Laden from Afghanistan. That decision followed Saudi and Emirati requests for his extradition.
The brief said Taliban figures had warned bin Laden to increase his security in case the hostage crisis in Kandahar was used to mount an operation against him. Parts of that passage remain redacted.
It also cited “international suspicions of Islamabad’s role in the hijacking”. Those suspicions, alongside Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf’s concerns about terrorism spilling into Pakistan, suggested he would respond to a new attack by increasing pressure on the Taliban to expel bin Laden, the assessment said.
The document recorded suspicions about Islamabad. It did not establish Pakistani responsibility for the hijacking.
A June 27, 2000, brief described Pakistani efforts to restrict bin Laden’s network. It said Islamabad was responding both to international pressure and fears that Islamic radicals could destabilise Pakistan.
Members of bin Laden’s group had complained about difficulties sending Arabs to other countries, apparently because travel through Pakistan was being curtailed. The assessment also reported the arrest of six associates of North African extremists during a raid near Peshawar.
The same brief recorded Taliban complaints that Islamabad had not delivered promised ammunition. The passage is partly redacted and does not establish whether any delivery subsequently occurred.
An earlier assessment, dated February 24, 1998, said leaders of the Pakistan-based Harakat ul-Ansar had joined Egyptian militant groups in signing bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on US interests and civilians worldwide.
The CIA said the collection traced analysts’ evolving understanding of al-Qaida and their attempts to warn of attack planning despite sparse, vague and imperfect information. More than 100 pages of analysis were released.
The August 28, 1998, assessment named India and Pakistan alongside Egypt, countries in the Arabian Peninsula, Uganda and possibly Nigeria as potential locations for attacks.
The source behind that information is redacted. The visible passage does not identify an Indian target, an attack date or a specific operational plan.
Titled Bin Ladin Terrorist Network Still a Threat, the brief said bin Laden and other terrorist leaders based in Afghanistan had survived US strikes. Their communications network remained intact, training had resumed at some camps and other camps were being moved.
It assessed that bin Laden could draw on individuals and allied groups in at least 60 countries to conduct attacks.
The document is among 71 President’s Daily Brief products declassified by CIA Director John Ratcliffe to mark the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. The agency described the collection as its largest release of declassified CIA presidential briefing products related to 9/11.
The documents also address the Kandahar hostage crisis and Pakistan’s dealings with militants associated with bin Laden.
A January 3, 2000, assessment said the Taliban’s Council of Ministers had unanimously decided the previous month against expelling bin Laden from Afghanistan. That decision followed Saudi and Emirati requests for his extradition.
The brief said Taliban figures had warned bin Laden to increase his security in case the hostage crisis in Kandahar was used to mount an operation against him. Parts of that passage remain redacted.
It also cited “international suspicions of Islamabad’s role in the hijacking”. Those suspicions, alongside Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf’s concerns about terrorism spilling into Pakistan, suggested he would respond to a new attack by increasing pressure on the Taliban to expel bin Laden, the assessment said.
The document recorded suspicions about Islamabad. It did not establish Pakistani responsibility for the hijacking.
A June 27, 2000, brief described Pakistani efforts to restrict bin Laden’s network. It said Islamabad was responding both to international pressure and fears that Islamic radicals could destabilise Pakistan.
Members of bin Laden’s group had complained about difficulties sending Arabs to other countries, apparently because travel through Pakistan was being curtailed. The assessment also reported the arrest of six associates of North African extremists during a raid near Peshawar.
The same brief recorded Taliban complaints that Islamabad had not delivered promised ammunition. The passage is partly redacted and does not establish whether any delivery subsequently occurred.
An earlier assessment, dated February 24, 1998, said leaders of the Pakistan-based Harakat ul-Ansar had joined Egyptian militant groups in signing bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on US interests and civilians worldwide.
The CIA said the collection traced analysts’ evolving understanding of al-Qaida and their attempts to warn of attack planning despite sparse, vague and imperfect information. More than 100 pages of analysis were released.
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